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GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF TOWN COUNCILS 
The Role of Private Law 
Benjamin Joshua ONG1 
BA (Jurisprudence) (Oxon), BCL (Oxon);  
Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore); Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management 
University.  
Section 42 of the Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) provides for the Government to provide 
grants to Town Councils “subject to such conditions as the Minister may determine”. The imposition 
of such conditions can be useful in theory. However, there is no clear mechanism by which such 
conditions may be enforced. This article proposes that this lacuna be filled as follows: such conditions 
are to take the form of private-law relationships between the Government and Town Councils. After 
outlining the benefits of this proposal, the article critiques the Court of Appeal’s decision in a 2016 case 
which held that such private-law relationships cannot exist as a matter of law, and explains why the 
proposal would be compatible with both the policy behind the Town Council scheme and the terms of 
the Town Councils Act. The article ends by commenting on how the proposal may be implemented in 
practice by means of contracts, trusts or bailments. 
 
1 The author is grateful to three anonymous reviewers and to Jack Tsen-Ta Lee for their helpful comments on 
previous versions of this article and the ideas discussed therein. However, all errors and omissions remain the 
author’s own. 
The author is also grateful to the Registry of the Supreme Court for granting  permission to inspect the case files 
relating to the cases of Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 
(HC) (HC/Originating Summons No 250 of 2015) and Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town 
Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 (CA) (CA/Civil Appeal No 114 of 2015). This enabled the author to verify that the 
understanding the author gained of parties’ submissions from reading the judgments was correct. However, 
nothing in the case files has added to what the author understood from reading the judgments; consequently, 
neither has it had any impact on any of the contents of this article. 
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I. Introduction: Use of grant conditions 
1 Since the introduction of the Town Councils Act2  (“TCA”) in 1989, the common 
property in public housing estates is managed by Town Councils (“TCs”) led by elected 
Members of Parliament.3 TCs are funded by levying charges on residents; through grants 
(known as “grants-in-aid”) from the Government4 and through income gained through the 
investment of existing funds.5 This article is concerned with the second of these sources. The 
TCA provides that grants-in-aid may be made “subject to such conditions as the Minister may 
determine” ( “grant conditions”).6 What may grant conditions be used for, and how may grant 
conditions be enforced? 
2 There could be, it is submitted, two possible functions served by imposing grant 
conditions: 
(a) The duty-enforcing function: grant conditions could be used to ensure that TCs 
perform their statutory duties (such as duties to keep common areas clean and to 
maintain proper accounts and internal financial controls) through the threat of grants-
in-aid being withheld and/or clawed back. This is potentially powerful. A review of 
 
2 Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed. 
3 Each town consists of the area comprising one or more electoral constituencies: Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 
2000 Rev Ed) s 3(1). 
4 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 42. As the Ministry of National Development (“MND”) is the 
government ministry in charge of such matters, in this article “the MND”, “the Minister”, and “the Government” 
will be used interchangeably. 
5 For more details, see Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 
(HC) at [42]–[47] and Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 
(CA) at [1]–[9]. 
6 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 42. “Minister” refers to the Minister for National Development. 
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TCs’ financial statements for the financial years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 
(summarised in the Appendix to this article)7 suggests that TCs are generally dependent 
on government grants, in that, without government grants, most TCs would incur an 
operating deficit. In other words, the Government is generally TCs’ most important 
source of funding. Therefore, grants-in-aid represent a powerful tool with which the 
Government can ensure that TCs perform their statutory duties: a TC which refuses 
grants-in-aid would have to deplete its reserves in the short run and/or provide lower 
levels of service to residents in the longer run, both of which would be likely to incur a 
high political cost. In the 2015 case of Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol 
East Town Council8 (“AHPETC”), the Court of Appeal alluded to this point, describing 
grant conditions as the:9 
… ample and indeed, in our judgment, the appropriate means by which to 
secure the ends of sound governance. To the extent the Minister has any 
concerns over the application of the grants-in-aid, it is open to him to condition 
the making of any or further grants-in-aid upon the Town Council agreeing to 
abide by appropriate safeguards. 
(b) The discretion-regulating function: one can imagine that grant conditions, if 
carefully crafted, could do more than just securing “sound governance”, which, one 
would think, is the minimum standard that is to be expected of TCs. Grant conditions 
could be used to set the boundaries within which TCs may exercise discretion as to the 
use of funds. The Government’s role in funding TCs suggests that TCs’ discretion as 
to the use of funds is not meant to be unfettered, notwithstanding that TCs are 
autonomous bodies with both the legal power and the democratic mandate to make 
 
7 See para 115 below and the accompanying table. 
8 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 (HC); Attorney-General 
v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 (CA). 
9 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [82]. 
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choices as to how they expend their funds. For example, one could imagine the 
Government wishing to fund certain types of project but not others, or to direct a TC as 
to what to do while leaving it to the TC to decide how to do it. In other words, there is 
a balance to be struck between TCs’ autonomy on the one hand, and the desire for the 
Government to maintain influence over the use of TCs’ funds on the other. The 
negotiation of grant conditions could serve as a means by which this balance could be 
struck in a flexible manner. This would be consonant with the Government’s statutory 
role as not only a regulator which aims to prevent misconduct, but also a funder, and 
therefore facilitator, of TCs’ activities for the good of residents.10 
3 However, all this potential is potentially wasted because, as this author has previously 
argued, it is not clear from either the TCA or the judgments in AHPETC how grant conditions 
may be enforced.11 There are therefore no legal mechanisms to hold TCs accountable for their 
use of government grants. As a result, the ability of grant conditions to serve the functions set 
out above is greatly reduced to near-vanishing point. This is particularly worrying given that, 
as mentioned above, government grants are generally TCs’ most important source of funding.12 
4 This is not a problem in so far as the duty-enforcing function is concerned. This function 
is now served by amendments to the TCA made in 2017 (“the 2017 amendments”),13 which 
introduced various new statutory mechanisms by which TCs may be held to their duties, hence 
 
10 The Government’s role in this regard is seen in s 42 of the Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) 
(“TCA”), which explicitly states that government grants to Town Councils (“TCs”) are made “[f]or the purposes 
of enabling a Town Council to carry out its functions under this Act or any other Act”. According to s 18(1)(a) of 
the TCA, the “functions” of a TC include “to control, manage, maintain and improve the common property of the 
residential and commercial property in the housing estates of the Board within the Town for the benefit of the 
residents of those housing estates” [emphasis added]. 
11 See Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Enforcing Town Councils’ Duties of Financial Prudence: Problems Addressed by 
the Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 923 at 940–941, paras 42–46. 
12 See para 2(a) above; see also the Appendix and the accompanying table below. 
13 Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017 (Act 17 of 2017). 
Benjamin Joshua Ong 
Government Funding of Town Councils: The Role of Private Law 
 
This paper has been published in the Singapore Academy of Law Journal: (2018) 30 SAcLJ 944.  
Please cite only the official published version, available from the Singapore Academy of Law Journal e-Archive: 
https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/Singapore-Academy-of-Law-Journal/e-Archive  
 
Page 5 of 56 
addressing the problem that it was effectively possible for a TC to “fail to perform [its] statutory 
duties and face only minimal consequences”.14 The new statutory provisions allow for the 
Minister for National Development (“the Minister”) to: 
(a) order “compliance reviews”15  and “investigation[s]”16  to determine whether 
TCs are carrying out their statutory duties;  
(b) issue “rectification order[s]” to compel the TC to take specified action to 
“address … deficiencies” or “correct [an] irregularity or to guard against the recurrence 
of irregularities” in the conduct of a TC’s affairs;17 and 
(c) in certain limited cases, to order that the TC members be temporarily suspended 
from office and replaced by an “official manager”.18 
5 However, there is a limit to what the new statutory provisions can do. The statutory 
provisions only  perform the duty-enforcing function. Moreover, they ensure this in a somewhat 
blunt fashion: their aim is no more or less than to secure the performance of those duties 
immediately. It has been observed above that grant conditions can be used to do much more 
than this by serving the discretion-regulating function.  
6 In fact, grant conditions should serve the discretion-regulating function, rather than 
merely ensuring that the minimum standards laid down by law are met. Surely any person who 
provides funding ought to have at least some influence in what that funding may be used for; 
 
14 Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Enforcing Town Councils’ Duties of Financial Prudence: Problems Addressed by the 
Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 923 at 942–943, para 49. 
15 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43A. 
16 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43B. 
17 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43D. 
18 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43G. 
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there is no reason why the Government’s funding a TC ought to be any different. But this 
would be meaningless unless the conditions attached to the use of funds is legally enforceable. 
Therefore, the usefulness of grant conditions is greatly diminished by the lack of a means to 
enforce them. 
7 This author previously identified the problem of how to enforce grant conditions as a 
“potential area for future development of the law”.19 This article aims to present a proposal to 
fulfil this potential. The proposal is that grant conditions can be made enforceable if they are 
made to take the legal form of private-law devices such as contracts, bailments or trusts. This 
will not only afford a measure of flexibility in the Government’s funding of TCs but also 
increase the legitimacy of the TC scheme by allowing the TC to play a clearer role in 
negotiating the grant conditions with the Government. 
8 Part II of this article20 sets out the proposal, while Parts III21 and IV22 defend the 
proposal against various possible objections. Finally, Part V23 explains how the proposal may 
be put into action by means of contracts, trusts and/or bailments. 
II. Usefulness of private law 
9 Private law has already developed several solutions to the problem of how A may both 
grant latitude to B to use A’s money, and at the same time impose restrictive conditions on the 
uses to which B may put the money or the manner in which B may manage the money. 
 
19 Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Enforcing Town Councils’ Duties of Financial Prudence: Problems Addressed by the 
Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 923 at 948, para 62. 
20 See paras 9–15 below. 
21 See paras 16–30 below. 
22 See paras 31–87 below. 
23 See paras 88–112 below. 
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(Examples include a contract between A and B imposing obligations on B, or an arrangement 
whereby B holds the money on trust for A.) 
10 This is precisely what grant conditions ought to be able to do, with A being the 
Government and B a TC. Private law is well placed to supply various juristic devices through 
which conditions may be attached to grants-in-aid, and by which those conditions may be 
enforced. This article will propose that grant conditions take this form of private-law 
relationships, such as relationships of contract, trust, and bailment, between the Government 
and TCs (“the Proposal”). 
11 The following are just a few possible examples of how the Proposal could be put into 
action: 
(a) Suppose the Government wishes to fund a TC’s expenditure, but only for a 
particular purpose (“purpose X”). One of the following mechanisms would allow this: 
(i) The TC holds grant money on an express Quistclose trust24  for the 
Government, with the duty to use the money only for purpose X. The money is 
to be disbursed into a separate bank account from the rest of the TC’s funds, 
which is to be monitored by an independent accountant. If the TC uses the grant 
money for purpose Y, or if the TC fails to carry out purpose X, the TC must 
restore the trust fund by replenishing the bank account, failing which the 
Government may sue the TC for breach of trust.  
 
24 An express Quistclose trust arises when “the settlor-donor [ie, the Government] … intend[s] to constitute the 
recipient [ie, the TC] as a trustee, and confer a power or duty on the recipient-trustee to apply the money 
exclusively in accordance with the stated purpose”: Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town 
Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [114(c)]. Note that some cases have taken issue with the term “express Quistclose 
trust” in favour of, for example, “express ‘Quistclose-type’ trust”: MSP4GE Asia Pte Ltd v MSP Global Pte Ltd 
[2019] SGHC 20 at [110]. 
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(ii) The TC is bailee of the Government’s grant money, with a direction to 
use that money only for purpose X. If the TC uses that money for purpose Y, or 
if the TC fails to carry out purpose X, then the TC is in breach of the terms of 
the bailment, and the Government may assert its right to immediate possession 
of the money (and sue to recover the same).  
(b) One can imagine more flexible possibilities to structure the use of grant moneys 
for a variety of purposes, each subject to varying levels of oversight by the Government. 
This could be done by way of contract. An illustration is as follows: the TC could enter 
into a contract with the Government, under which $a is disbursed to be used as the TC 
sees fit; $b for the use of purpose X only, failing which $b will be repayable 
immediately; and $c for the use of purpose Y only and on certain conditions which, if 
not met, will entitle the Government to a partial repayment for each month during which 
those conditions are not met.25 
12 The chief benefit of this method of making grant conditions enforceable, besides 
preventing the problem of grant conditions being toothless, is flexibility. There are three 
dimensions to this: 
(a) First, it would be open to the Government and the TC to negotiate the grant 
conditions. TCs’ role in such negotiations would be in line with their autonomy and 
independence in accordance with the aims of the TC scheme, as opposed to their being 
mere passive recipients of money from the Government. At the same time, once such 
negotiations are concluded, their outcome will be formalised and given legally binding 
effect, increasing certainty as to the terms eventually agreed upon. 
 
25 The contract will need to be drafted such that the obligations to pay money to the Government take the form of 
a debt (ie, a primary obligation to pay money), as opposed to damages (ie, a secondary obligation to pay 
compensation for the breach of a primary obligation). See generally Chitty on Contracts (Hugh G Beale gen ed) 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 32nd Ed, 2015) at para 26-008. 
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(b) Second, as explained above, the grant conditions could take a multitude of 
possible forms, allowing for varying degrees of restriction on the use of grant money.  
(c) Third, there would be flexibility in dealing with situations of breach of the terms 
of grant conditions. Of course, the Government could bring an action for breach; but, 
alternatively, the credible threat of bringing such an action could serve as a bargaining 
chip in further negotiations between the Government and the TC, leading to a form of 
alternative dispute resolution. For example, the Government and TC might reach a 
compromise agreement in which, in consideration of the Government fully or partly 
waiving its claim, the conditions are further tightened.  
In short, the Proposal would ensure that, even as the Government exercises influence over TCs’ 
use of funds, there is continuous space for political negotiation in the management of TCs.  
13 One might ask whether the existence of such private-law relationships would be 
incompatible with the statutory scheme governing Town Councils and their relationship with 
the Government. For the reasons explained in Part IV,26 there is no incompatibility. On the 
contrary, private-law relationships of the sort proposed above would fit perfectly harmoniously 
with the statutory scheme governing grants-in-aid. The relevant statutory provision is s 42 of 
the TCA:  
For the purposes of enabling a Town Council to carry out its functions under this Act or any 
other Act, the Minister may from time to time make grants-in-aid to the Town Council of such 
sums of money and subject to such conditions as the Minister may determine out of moneys to 
be provided by Parliament. 
Section 42 contemplates a Government–TC relationship with characteristics similar to those of 
private-law relationships: 
 
26 See paras 31–87 below. 
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(a) First, the statutory scheme envisages that grants-in-aid may be given on 
condition that they be used for a specific purpose only.27 This is precisely what is 
envisaged by, for example, a Quistclose trust. 
(b) Second, moneys paid to TCs under this scheme are described as grants of 
money, as opposed to, say, allocation of money. In other words, they are offered by the 
Minister, and TCs are free to accept or to reject them;28 it is not the case that moneys, 
with attendant conditions, are simply foisted on TCs. Similarly, for example, the laws 
surrounding contracts and of Quistclose trusts are concerned with seeing to it that 
obligations are undertaken voluntarily and with the obligor’s consent. 
14 Further, the law is clear that TCs and the Government have the capacity to enter into 
such private-law relationships. A TC has the capacity to “sue and be sued” in its own “corporate 
name”,29 and to enter into contracts.30 Correspondingly, the Government has the power to 
“acquire, hold and dispose of property of any kind and to make contracts”.31 Moreover, TCs’ 
private-law capacity as set out in the TCA overlaps strikingly with the way in which grants-in-
aid work. According to s 19(1)(b) of the TCA, TCs have the capacity to:  
 
27 This is evident from s 39(12) of the Town Councils Act (Ca0 329A, 2000 Rev Ed):  
[A] Town Council may differentiate the rates of [conservancy and service charges levied in respect of 
flats] to take into account any grants-in-aid made under section 42 which are expressed to be for the 
benefit of any class of owners of flats. [emphasis added] 
28 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [72]–[74]. 
29 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 5. 
30 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 7. 
31 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 37. 
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… acquire and hold property of any description if, in the opinion of the Town Council, 
the property is necessary for the … performance of any purpose which the Town 
Council is required or is permitted … to perform … [emphasis added]  
and:  
… subject to the terms and conditions upon which the property is held, to dispose of 
the property [emphasis added]. 
Grants-in-aid are perfectly harmonious with this provision. They are disbursements of property 
for the performance of purposes which a TC is required or permitted to perform; and they are 
held by, and expendable by, TCs subject to terms and conditions.  
15 Having set out the Proposal, the author will explore in Part V32  how it might be 
implemented in practice. Before that, however, it must be defended against various types of 
possible objection. This will be done over the next two parts of this article. In Part III,33 the 
author will deal with the most immediate obstacle, which is created by the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in AHPETC; it will be argued that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that no private-
law relationships can exist between the Government and TCs. In Part IV,34 the author will 
reject the view that the Proposal is not possible because it would contravene the policy or 
specific provisions of the TCA.  
III. Court of Appeal’s objection to applicability of private law 
16 The first possible objection that must be dealt with is the one arising from the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in AHPETC. In that case, the Government, through the Ministry of National 
Development (“MND”), had sought to enforce the  
 
32 See paras 88–112 below. 
33 See paras 16–30 below. 
34 See paras 31–87 below. 
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Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council’s (“AHPETC’s”) statutory duties. Besides the 
statutory remedy in s 21(2) of the TCA,35 the MND claimed that it had a right of action against 
AHPETC by virtue of a contract and/or a relationship of Quistclose trust between the 
Government and AHPETC. However, the Court of Appeal held that such relationships could 
not exist as a matter of law. It will now be argued that this view was misplaced, and, in truth, 
presents no bar to the Proposal. 
17 In attempting to sue AHPETC on a contract and/or a Quistclose trust, the MND had 
sought to argue that the contract and the trust contained terms to the effect that AHPETC was 
to perform its statutory duties. However, the Court of Appeal held that the relationships 
between the Government and TCs, being “governed by statute”, must fall solely within the 
realm of “public law”, and create “rights and obligations [which] could not be determined 
 
35 Section 21(1)(f) of the Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) (“TCA”) provides that Town Councils 
(“TCs”) have the duty to “comply with the provisions of [the TCA] and the rules made thereunder”. Section 21(2) 
provides:  
Where a requirement or duty is imposed on a Town Council by this section, the [Housing and 
Development] Board or any person for whose benefit, or for the benefit of whose flat that requirement 
or duty is imposed on the Town Council, may apply to the High Court for an order compelling the Town 
Council to carry out the requirement or perform the duty, as the case may be. 
For completeness, it should be noted that the Court of Appeal had held that the MND was not a “person for whose 
benefit, or for the benefit of whose flat” the TCA imposed duties on TCs. However, the Court of Appeal granted 
the Housing and Development Board’s application under s 21(2). For more details, see Benjamin Joshua Ong, 
“Enforcing Town Councils’ Duties of Financial Prudence: Problems Addressed by the Town Councils 
(Amendment) Act 2017” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 923 at 929–932, paras 11–16. 
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based on private law concepts”.36 There was said to be a “fundamental distinction”37 between 
“public law and private law”.38 Therefore, said the Court of Appeal, the MND could not:39 
… fundamentally alter the very basis of the relationship [between itself and TCs] from 
one founded in and regulated by statute to one in trust, agency or any other private law 
concept. It is not appropriate, on the facts of the present case, to add such private law 
overlays to the statutory relationship between the Minister and the Town Councils. 
Indeed, there is nothing at all in the TCA to suggest otherwise. This also forecloses the 
MND’s alternative contention based on a legal interest pursuant to a contractual 
mandate and a beneficial interest under a Quistclose trust. 
Instead, said the Court of Appeal, “any remedy for any failure to apply any [grant] money in 
accordance with the TCA must rest in the TCA as a matter of public law and be based upon it” 
[emphasis added].40 
18 In essence, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning appears to have been as follows: 
(a) The Government–TC relationship is “regulated by statute”. 
(b) A matter which is “regulated by statute” is a matter of “public law”. 
(c) A matter of “public law” must have nothing to do with “private law”. 
 
36 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [124].  
37 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [126]. 
38 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [125] and [127]. 
39 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [123]. 
40 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [128]. 
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With respect, this reasoning is incorrect because it is based on both a category mistake and a 
false dichotomy. 
A. The category mistake 
19 First, the Court of Appeal’s remarks suggest that a relationship “regulated by statute” 
must ipso facto have nothing to do with private law. However, this is a category mistake. 
Private law is a type of legal relationship between legal persons, while a statute is a source of 
legal relationships or of legal persons. (That is why there are such things as statutory torts, 
statutory contracts, and statutory trusts.) The Court of Appeal therefore erred in suggesting that 
“regulated by statute” is equivalent to “public law”, or that it is the antithesis of “private law”. 
In truth, the mere fact that there is a statutory relationship between the Government and TCs 
does not preclude the existence of separate private-law relationships. Nothing in the Proposal 
entails that the TCA be undermined or subverted. On the contrary, the private-law relationships 
envisaged by the Proposal will complement the statutory scheme. 
20 In support of its view, the Court of Appeal cited the case of Re Patricia Isobel Gold41 
(“Gold”), which, in the Court of Appeal’s words, was said to stand for the principle that:42  
… [s]ince the relationship between the applicant and the body corporate was one that 
arose out of and was governed by statute, their mutual rights and obligations could not 
be determined based on private law concepts. [emphasis added] 
The implication was that the Government, similarly, could not have had “rights and 
obligations” vis-à-vis a TC other than those set out in the Act. 
21 However, Gold said no such thing. The case involved a proprietor of a unit in a strata 
development who had failed to pay levies to the Management Corporation (“the 
 
41 [1996] FCA 1274. 
42 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [124].  
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Corporation”).43 She argued that she did not have to pay the levies because the articles of the 
Corporation constituted a contract between her and the Corporation,44 which the Corporation 
had allegedly breached.45 The Federal Court of Australia rejected this contention because the 
obligation to pay the levies came not from any contract but from a statutory provision.46 
However, that court did not say that a contractual analysis could not apply because a statutory 
regime existed. What it said was that a contractual analysis did not apply because the rights in 
question were, on the facts, not contractual in nature.  
22 In other words, in principle, there could have been a contractual relationship between 
residents and the Corporation in addition to the statutory relationship. In fact, the contents of 
the contract could even have reproduced the statutory rights and obligations in question. A 
fortiori, it must have been possible for there to be a contract between a resident and the 
Corporation which contained terms other than a condition that the Corporation perform its 
obligation under the Act. 
23 Similarly, even though the TCA now allows the Government to take action to enforce 
a TC’s statutory duties, this ought not to preclude the Proposal that the Government be allowed 
to enter into separate private-law relationships with TCs. What the Court of Appeal in 
AHPETC was anxious to avoid was the replacement of the TCA by contracts and trusts. But 
the Proposal will entail no such thing. 
 
43 More details about this case may be gleaned from the judgment in Gold v Proprietors – Units Plan No 52 (1992) 
110 FLR 356. 
44 Unit Titles Act 1970 (ACT) s 79. 
45 Re Patricia Isobel Gold [1996] FCA 1274 at [24]. 
46 Re Patricia Isobel Gold [1996] FCA 1274 at [23] and [25]. 
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B. The false dichotomy 
24 The Court of Appeal’s reasoning in AHPETC was also premised on a dichotomy 
between “public law” and “private law”: it held that the Government’s and a TC’s “mutual 
rights and obligations [cannot] be determined based on private law concepts” but instead “must 
rest in the TCA as a matter of public law”.47 
25 However, this dichotomy is a false one. Even if s 42 of the TCA, which empowers the 
Government to disburse grants-in-aid to TCs, creates a relationship of “public law” between 
the Government and TCs, that does not mean that “private law” has no role to play. On the 
contrary, public law can give rise to a power to enter into a private-law relationship.  
26 A useful analogy is that of public housing authorities in the UK. When such an authority 
exercises its discretion to decide whether or not to provide housing to someone, it thereby 
performs a “public law functio[n]”.48 However, if the decision to provide housing is made, then 
“rights and obligations [may be] immediately created in the field of private law”49 (such as a 
lease or a licence). 
27 Similarly, the Proposal is based on the notion that, in the context of grants-in-aid, public 
law dictates the circumstances in which grants are to be made, while private law structures the 
implementation of grants, including disbursement and recovery. Thus: 
 
47 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [123], [124] and [128]. 
48 Cocks v Thanet District Council [1983] 2 AC 286 at 292F. 
49 Cocks v Thanet District Council [1983] 2 AC 286 at 292H–293B. The original quotation from the case reads 
“are immediately created”. The author has substituted it with “may be immediately created” because of the caveat 
pointed out in O’Rourke v Camden LBC [1998] AC 188 that private-law rights and obligations do not arise 
immediately and automatically once the housing authority has made its decision; rather, the housing authority’s 
making its decision is a pre-condition for its going on to take steps to bring into existence private-law rights and 
obligations. 
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(a) Section 42 of the TCA gives rise to the Minister’s discretionary power to make 
grants-in-aid to a TC. The exercise of this power is governed by public law norms. For 
example, a TC may seek judicial review of the Minister’s decision not to make a grant 
if this decision is made in bad faith or as a result of taking into account irrelevant 
considerations. 
(b) But once the Minister decides to exercise his power to make a grant-in-aid to a 
TC, the mechanism through which he does so may be the creation of what amounts in 
private law to (for example) a conveyance pursuant to a contract, a passing of 
possession pursuant to a bailment, or the constitution of a Quistclose trust. If either 
party does not act in accordance with the terms thereof, then the other party may seek 
a private-law remedy. 
There is therefore no contradiction between the private-law relationships proposed and the 
“public” character of the Government and the MND. 
28 In support of its view that there is a “fundamental distinction” between public law and 
private law, the Court of Appeal cited the case of Swain v Law Society.50 In this case, the Law 
Society of England and Wales took out a “master policy” from an insurance broker, and made 
it compulsory for individual solicitors to pay premiums on this policy, in return for which the 
Law Society would receive commissions from the insurance broker for each solicitor who was 
insured.51 The House of Lords rejected the view that the Law Society was liable to account for 
the commissions as a fiduciary for the solicitors. According to Lord Diplock, this was because 
the Law Society was acting in a “public capacity” rather than a “private capacity”52 as the entire 
 
50 [1983] AC 598. 
51 Swain v Law Society [1983] AC 598 at 609E, 609G and 610E–610F. 
52 Swain v Law Society [1983] AC 598 at 607H–608A. 
Benjamin Joshua Ong 
Government Funding of Town Councils: The Role of Private Law 
 
This paper has been published in the Singapore Academy of Law Journal: (2018) 30 SAcLJ 944.  
Please cite only the official published version, available from the Singapore Academy of Law Journal e-Archive: 
https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/Singapore-Academy-of-Law-Journal/e-Archive  
 
Page 18 of 56 
insurance scheme was an exercise of statutory powers that would bind all solicitors, rather than 
only those who were members of the Law Society.53 
29 However, with respect, this reasoning is based on the same false dichotomy that has 
just been criticised. It is submitted that the correct analysis is as follows. The Law Society’s 
decision to enter into the insurance scheme sounded in public law, and could be challenged by 
any solicitor by way of judicial review. But the scheme itself, if valid as a matter of public law, 
had ramifications in private law which potentially created private-law rights on the part of the 
individual solicitors who had made payments. Lord Brightman’s reasoning in the case is to be 
preferred: unlike Lord Diplock, he did not deny that, as a matter of law, the Law Society could 
in principle “constitute itself a trustee of the master policy contract” for its members; rather, he 
disposed of the case on the basis that there was, on the facts, no such trust.54 
30 In conclusion, the Court of Appeal was, based on what the author has just argued to be 
shaky authority, attacking a straw man when it stated that the MND cannot “fundamentally 
alter the very basis of the relationship [between the Government and TCs] … [and] add … 
private law overlays to the statutory relationship between the Minister and the Town 
Councils”.55 This was not what the MND was saying should be done; neither is it what the 
Proposal would entail. The MND had not claimed that TCs should be regulated by “private 
law” and not “public law”. Nor would the Proposal involve attempting to overlay private law 
on top of public law. Rather, it would simply involve a recognition that the statutory grant 
scheme, which creates public-law power to make grants, leaves space for private law to operate 
once that public-law power has been validly and effectively exercised. 
 
53 Swain v Law Society [1983] AC 598 at 608C–608D. 
54 Swain v Law Society [1983] AC 598 at 620F–621E. 
55 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [123]. 
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IV. The Proposal’s compatibility with policy of TCA 
31 For the reasons above, it does not follow from the mere existence of a statutory scheme 
governing TCs that there can be no private-law relationships between the Government and 
TCs. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal’s judgment ought to make one pause to consider 
whether there is something particular to the TCA that militates against such relationships. This 
is important because the common law recognises a general principle that a common-law cause 
of action cannot be allowed to stultify a statutory policy.56 For example, one cannot sue for 
breach of statutory duty when there is an existing statutory remedy for the breach of that duty;57 
one cannot make a claim in unjust enrichment to reverse transfers made pursuant to a contract 
if doing so would “undermine the fundamental policy that rendered the underlying contract 
void and unenforceable”;58 and one might not be able to sue to enforce a contract for the 
purpose of contravening a statutory provision59 or even the “policy objective” of a statute.60 
Recently, the High Court (constituted by three judges) articulated a more general principle: one 
will not be allowed to claim a legal right which violates and is outweighed by a public policy 
embodied in the “value or purpose”61 of a statute.62 
 
56 The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
57 Doe dem Murray, Lord Bishop of Rochester v Bridges (1854) 1 B & Ad 847 at 859; (1854) 109 ER 1001 at 
1006; see also the cases cited at n 63, and the discussion at paras 73-74 below. 
58 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [159]. For discussion of a more general principle of 
non-stultification of statutory policy, see [161] and [168]. 
59 Ting Siew May v Boon Lay Choo [2014] 3 SLR 609 at [75]. 
60 Ting Siew May v Boon Lay Choo [2014] 3 SLR 609 at [84]. 
61 UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874 at [162(a)(i)(A)]. 
62 UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874 at [162(a)(i)(A)], [162(a)(iv)] and [162(b)]. On a similar note, in 
the context of trusts, see V Nithia v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam [2015] 5 SLR 1422 at [74], discussed in Tang 
Hang Wu, “Equity and Trusts” (2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev 450 at 460, para 15.24. 
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32 For present purposes, there are two issues to discuss: 
(a) The first involves a general discussion of the policies underlying the TC 
scheme, and a consideration of whether the Proposal would contradict them.  
(b) The second calls for a comparison of the Proposal with various remedies and 
actions which might be available to the Government against a TC. This is necessary 
because of what will be called the “Bridges rule”: “where an Act creates an obligation, 
and enforces the performance in a specified manner … that performance cannot be 
enforced in any other manner”.63 
A. The Proposal is not incompatible with statutory policy on Government–TC relations 
33 The idea of private-law relationships between two bodies is premised on the two bodies 
being in substance separate entities, as opposed to one being part of the other. In other words, 
for the Proposal to make sense, TCs cannot be mere emanations of the Government.  
34 Any scheme of local government must address the question of exactly how much 
discretion local government bodies have, and thus, conversely, how much control the central 
government has. This depends on the answer to a fundamental policy question, which Paul 
Craig phrases as being a choice between “two opposing views of central-local relations, that 
which sees the latter as a mere agent of the former, and that which accords the two a more 
equal or autonomous status”.64 He calls the former the “agency view”, which is based on the 
idea that “[d]ivergent treatment of the same problem in different areas is regarded as unjust”.65 
 
63 Doe dem Murray, Lord Bishop of Rochester v Bridges (1854) 1 B & Ad 847 at 859; (1854) 109 ER 1001 at 
1006. This principle has been endorsed several times by the English courts: eg, Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co 
Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173 at 185B–185C; X v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633 at 731E–731G; and Morshead 
Mansions Ltd v Di Marco (No 2) [2014] 1 WLR 1799 at [25]–[26]. 
64 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2012) at p 159, para 6-015. 
65 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2012) at p 159, para 6-015. 
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By contrast, the latter focuses on the principle of respect for the choices of a democratically 
elected body. Of course, there are “[s]hades of grey” between the two models; the latter, in 
particular, acknowledges that local authorities’ choices should only “within bounds be 
respected. What those bounds are is the focus of debate”66 [emphasis added]. 
35 If TCs are just agents through which the Government acts, then the relationship between 
the two would have been like that between “the human body and its members” – TCs would 
be akin to the hands of the Government, and it is “nonsensical … to say: ‘My hand is holding 
this pen as my agent, or as trustee for me’”.67  
36 If, on the other hand, TCs are autonomous, then, even if they are in some sense servants 
of the Government, they would “remai[n] separate from the [Government] and [are] not and 
d[o] not become the [Government]”.68 In such a case, a TC would in principle be capable of 
being a trustee for the Government, or a party to a contract with the Government; there would 
be no conflict between the Proposal and the policy of the TCA. 
37 The author will now show that TCs are indeed autonomous from the Government (and 
its statutory boards), and that this is in line with the policy behind the TCA. This will be done 
by analysing the position of TCs vis-à-vis both: 
(a) statutory boards and other agencies of the Government (which are creatures of 
various statutes), for example, the Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) 
(“statutory authorities”); and 
 
66 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2012) at p 160, para 6-015. 
67 Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 at 400G, per Lord Simon.  
68 Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 at 393E, per Lord Morris (dissenting). 
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(b) the Government itself (that is, the executive government which is a creature of 
the Constitution). 
 TCs’ autonomy from HDB and other statutory authorities 
38 TCs are free to make choices on matters which are inherently subjective and on which 
there can be legitimate divergence of opinion. This includes developing the “distinctive 
character” of towns,69 such as by painting murals, creating gardens,70 and installing benches 
and “poles for bird singing”.71 (If not for TCs, these matters would be under the HDB’s 
purview.) TCs may also choose what investments to make because they “are in the best position 
to determine the balance that suits their respective financial requirement and risk tolerance”.72 
For these reasons, M Shamsul Haque 73  analyses Town Councils as “possess[ing] certain 
characteristics of devolution”, which he defines as “the transfer of functions and decision-
making authority to the legally incorporated local government” [emphasis added].74  
 
69 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (3 March 2014) vol 9 “Measures to Protect Interests of 
Residents of Town Councils” (Khaw Boon Wan, Minister for National Development). 
70 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (28 June 1988) vol 51 at col 374 (S Dhanabalan, Minister 
for National Development). 
71 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (28 June 1988) vol 51 at col 380 (Goh Chok Tong, First 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence). 
72 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (17 November 2008) vol 85 at col 705 (Grace Fu Hai Yien, 
Senior Minister of State for National Development, for the Minister of National Development). 
73 M Shamsul Haque, “A Grassroots Approach to Decentralization in Singapore” (1996) 4 Asian Journal of 
Political Science 64 at 73–75. “Devolution” is opposed to “delegation”, in which a local government authority is 
“transfer[red] … government functions … but still work[s] as the agents of the state”; or “deconcentration”, in 
which the “transfer of functions” still takes place “along the central government hierarchy”. 
74 M Shamsul Haque, “A Grassroots Approach to Decentralization in Singapore” (1996) 4 Asian Journal of 
Political Science 64 at 73. 
Benjamin Joshua Ong 
Government Funding of Town Councils: The Role of Private Law 
 
This paper has been published in the Singapore Academy of Law Journal: (2018) 30 SAcLJ 944.  
Please cite only the official published version, available from the Singapore Academy of Law Journal e-Archive: 
https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/Singapore-Academy-of-Law-Journal/e-Archive  
 
Page 23 of 56 
39 On the other hand, although TCs are autonomous (to the exclusion of the involvement 
of the HDB) within these areas, these areas are small. Three points may be made, which may 
prompt one to think that TCs are in reality mere “agents of the HDB”.75 As will now be argued, 
such a view is too simplistic, and would not do justice to the areas in which TCs do have 
discretion or, at least, a role in negotiating the boundaries of their discretion. 
(a) Restrictions on TCs’ priorities 
40 First, TCs face pressure to prioritise certain functions over others. In an annual Town 
Council Management Report (“Report”) published by the MND, TCs are graded on matters 
such as “estate cleanliness, lift performance, S&CC arrears management and corporate 
governance”.76 Residents may then use the Report as a tool by which to judge their TC’s 
performance. In addition, TCs are statutorily required to prioritise “cyclical maintenance 
works”,77 in that they are required to transfer most or all of their operating surpluses to their 
sinking funds at the end of every election cycle so as to ensure that money is set aside for these 
purposes.  
41 Nonetheless, even in such areas, TCs retain discretion as to how to discharge their 
duties. Moreover, TCs have the power to make discretionary decisions as to how far they will 
 
75 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (29 June 1988) vol 51 at cols 415–416 (Chiam See Tong):  
Town Councillors, technically, are nothing more than the agents of the HDB to do the cleaning and the 
repair of buildings in HDB estates … there is in fact an inconsistency or a contradiction … because [TCs] 
do not own the property and [TCs] are asked to manage it, to take care of it. 
76 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (5 February 2013) vol 90 “Written Answers to Questions 
for Oral Answer [sic] not Answered by 3.00pm: Annual Grants for Town Councils” (Khaw Boon Wan, Minister 
for National Development). See the website of the MND <https://www.mnd.gov.sg/our-work/regulating-town-
councils/town-council-management-report-(tcmr)> (accessed 9 May 2019) for the Town Council Management 
Report framework and past Town Council Management Reports. 
77 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (10 October 1996) vol 66 at cols 666–667 (Lim Hng Kiang, 
Minister for National Development). 
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go above and beyond performing such duties. TCs may “decide on the priority between many 
desirable services and the standard of each service”, so as to “shape a distinct identity for each 
estate”. 78  In other words, once they have met minimum compulsory standards (such as 
cleanliness), they are free to allocate their remaining resources toward either further improving 
on those standards, or on other projects. 
(b) HDB’s ultimate power as landlord 
42 Second, the HDB is ultimately the “landlord and lessor” of housing estates.79 Thus, for 
example, TCs have been “required to obtain the permission of the HDB for development plans 
including the addition of facilities.”80 One might therefore think that, save in certain narrow 
areas, a TC can have latitude but only to the extent that the HDB allows it.81 
43 But even then, the TC does not thereby become a mere vassal of the HDB. The TCA 
explicitly states that TCs are to manage parking places, industrial properties, markets, and food 
 
78 Ooi Giok Ling, Town Councils in Singapore: Self-Determination for Public Housing Estates (Institute of Policy 
Studies Occasional Paper No 4) (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1990) at p 19, citing remarks of Lee Kuan 
Yew, The Sunday Times (2 July 1989). 
79 Thio Li-ann, “Neither Fish nor Fowl: Town Councils, Community Development Councils and the Cultivation 
of Local Government/Governance in Singapore” in Municipi d’Oriente: Il Governo Locale in Europa Orientale, 
Asia e Australia (Hiroko Kudo, Giampaolo Ladu & Lucio Pegoraro eds) (Centre for Constitutional Studies and 
Democratic Development, 2009) 
<https://www.academia.edu/601385/_Neither_Fish_nor_Fowl_Town_Councils_Community_Development_Co
uncils_and_the_Cultivation_of_Local_Government_Governance_in_Singapore> (accessed 9 May 2019) at p 12. 
 
80 Ooi Giok Ling, “Town Councils in Public Housing Estates: Change and Implications” in City & the State: 
Singapore’s Built Environment Revisited (Ooi Giok Ling & Kenson Kwok eds) (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1997) ch 3 at p 57.  
81 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (28 June 1988) vol 51 at cols 376–377 (S Dhanabalan, 
Minister for National Development); Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) ss 19(2)–19(3). 
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centres “upon terms and conditions agreed between the Town Council and the Board”.82 In 
other words, the TCA explicitly contemplates that, even as the HDB plays a supervisory role, 
TCs have the power to negotiate their role. Similarly, works done “on any common property 
of the housing estates within the Town on behalf of the Board” are to be done on terms agreed 
on between the HDB and the TC;83 the same applies to works which the TC carries out “on the 
request of any statutory authority or any community-based association”.84  
(c) TCs’ duty to co-operate with public bodies 
44 Third, as of 2017, s 21A(1) of the TCA requires that: 
… [a] Town Council must, in the exercise of its powers and the performance of its 
functions and duties under this Act in relation to the residential property and 
commercial property in the housing estates of the Board within its Town, work 
cooperatively and in collaboration with [the HDB and various other statutory 
authorities and public officers].  
45 But even then, this provision implicitly reaffirms that TCs are not mere emanations of 
these authorities, nor are their duties co-extensive. The word “cooperatively” indicates that 
TCs play a much more active role than merely taking marching orders from statutory 
authorities. Indeed, s 21A(7) of the TCA explicitly affirms that TCs are “not prohibit[ed] … 
from proposing reasonable terms and conditions for carrying out [such] activities” even 
notwithstanding TCs’ duty to co-operate with statutory authorities. 
 
82 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 19(2)(a)(i). 
83 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 19(2)(b). 
84 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 19(3). 
Benjamin Joshua Ong 
Government Funding of Town Councils: The Role of Private Law 
 
This paper has been published in the Singapore Academy of Law Journal: (2018) 30 SAcLJ 944.  
Please cite only the official published version, available from the Singapore Academy of Law Journal e-Archive: 
https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/Singapore-Academy-of-Law-Journal/e-Archive  
 
Page 26 of 56 
46 The Public Sector (Governance) Act 2018,85 when brought into force, would go even 
further. It would specifically exclude Town Councils from its definitions of “public body” and 
“public sector”, and therefore affirm that Town Councils have nothing at all to do with a 
“whole-of-government approach to the delivery of services”.86 
47 One might next retort as follows: under s 21A(2) of the TCA, if a TC has “unreasonably 
delayed, hampered or prevented” a statutory authority from carrying out their functions in 
relation to common property, that authority may direct the TC to “do, or refrain from doing, 
such things as are specified … as to facilitate or enable [the authority] … to so perform that 
function”. Because the failure to comply with such a direction is a criminal offence, it may at 
first blush appear that such a direction has the effect of subjugating the TC’s autonomy to the 
desires of various statutory authorities, thus detracting from the TC’s autonomy vis-à-vis those 
authorities. 
48 To an extent, this is true, in the sense that it privileges these other statutory authorities’ 
discretion over the TCs’ discretion. However, the effect of such a direction will rarely conflict 
with TCs’ discretion. All that such a direction tells the TC to do is to refrain from 
“unreasonably” preventing other statutory authorities from doing what the latter have legal 
power to do. Further, such a direction may only be made in limited circumstances, viz, in 
relation to work which: 
(a) falls within the scope of the HDB “in the discharge of [its] functions under the 
Housing and Development Act”; or  
 
85 Act 5 of 2018. 
86 Public Sector (Governance) Act 2018 (Act 5 of 2018) ss 2–3. The author is grateful to an anonymous referee 
for this point. 
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(b) falls within the scope of “any statutory authority or public officer performing 
functions (but without specific power) under any written law”;87 and relates to the 
narrow purposes of “public safety”, “public order”, “preventing disease or injury”, 
“creating and maintaining a healthy environment”, or “electronic, information and 
communication technologies so as to improve quality of life for residents”.88 
49 In short, notwithstanding the limited nature of TCs’ discretion, the extent and nature of 
the limits is such that TCs are autonomous from statutory authorities.  
 TCs’ autonomy from the Government 
50 So much for TCs’ autonomy from statutory authorities. What about independence from 
the Government itself? The various statutory procedures by which the Government may assert 
control over TCs must now be examined. In particular, the 2017 amendments to the TCA must 
be examined to determine whether they evince a legislative intention to reduce TCs’ autonomy 
from what was envisaged when the TC scheme was introduced in 1989. 
51 This inquiry will show that the new statutory provisions have the potential to curtail 
TCs’ autonomy in exceptional circumstances, but not at all to the extent that TCs become mere 
emanations of the Government.  
(a) The former s 50 procedure 
52 The first such provision that must be examined is what will be called “the s 50 
procedure”, which existed prior to the 2017 amendments to the TCA. In AHPETC, the Court 
 
87 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 21A(1). 
88 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 21A(1)(b). 
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of Appeal put forth the view that, although the Government could not bring a private-law claim 
against a TC, the Government might still have “recourse … pursuant to s 50 of the TCA”.89 
53 Section 50 of the TCA covered two sorts of situation. For convenience, these will be 
referred to as “limb (a)” and “limb (b)”:90 
(a) If a TC had “failed to keep or maintain any part of the common property … in 
a state of good and serviceable repair or in a proper and clean condition”, then the 
Minister could appoint “any person” to “perform such powers, duties and functions of 
the Town Council and for such period as may be specified in the [Minister’s] order”. 
(b) If “any duty of a Town Council must be carried out urgently in order to remove 
any imminent danger to the health or safety of residents”, then the Minister could 
appoint “any person” to “carry out any duty of the Town Council so as to remove the 
danger”. 
54 The “person” would act “in the name and on behalf of the Town Council”. The TC had 
to accept that person’s decisions and bear the costs thereof.91 The TC could not, say, attempt 
to reduce costs by giving instructions to the “person” on how to go about its tasks. 
55 Might it be said that, once s 50 had been invoked, the Minister’s powers would have 
been so broad as to oust the TC’s discretion? Might it further be said that, because the Minister 
was in such cases capable of replacing the TC, there was (as the Court of Appeal said) no need 
 
89 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915 at [123]. 
90 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 50(1), prior to the Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017 (Act 
17 of 2017). 
91 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 50(5), prior to the Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017 (Act 
17 of 2017). 
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for the Minister to be able to sue the TC? Not quite. The existence of the s 50 procedure did 
not have the effect of rendering the TC a mere vassal of the Government. 
56 The s 50 procedure was available only in limited circumstances, namely, when the 
preconditions in limb (a) or (b) were made out. These preconditions were but a narrow subset 
of the functions and duties of TCs,92 and concerned a TC’s most basic functions. The s 50 
procedure was not available merely in the event that, for instance, the Minister disagreed with 
the TC’s discretionary decisions; or even that the TC had allegedly failed to “control, manage, 
maintain and improve the common property”.93  
57 And even then, it would likely have been open to a TC which thought that the scope of 
the Minister’s order was too wide to challenge the order by way of judicial review. Had this 
ever taken place, the courts might even have been inclined to hold that any use of the s 50 
procedure to replace the “person” to any extent greater than that necessary for restoring a “state 
of good and serviceable repair” and a “proper and clean condition” or “remov[ing] the danger” 
would have been an exercise of statutory powers for improper purposes, and quashed it 
accordingly. 
58 In short, the former s 50 procedure did not detract from TCs’ autonomy from the 
Government. It is not completely accurate to say, pace Thio, that the s 50 procedure means that 
“TCs do not have a free hand in running towns”.94 
 
92 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) ss 18 and 21. 
93 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 18(1)(a). 
94 Thio Li-ann, “Neither Fish nor Fowl: Town Councils, Community Development Councils and the Cultivation 
of Local Government/Governance in Singapore” in Municipi d’Oriente: Il Governo Locale in Europa Orientale, 
Asia e Australia (Hiroko Kudo, Giampaolo Ladu & Lucio Pegoraro eds) (Centre for Constitutional Studies and 
Democratic Development, 2009) 
<https://www.academia.edu/601385/_Neither_Fish_nor_Fowl_Town_Councils_Community_Development_Co
uncils_and_the_Cultivation_of_Local_Government_Governance_in_Singapore> (accessed 9 May 2019) at p 11. 
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(b) Overview of 2017 amendments 
59 In 2017, the s 50 procedure was abolished and replaced with two sets of statutory 
mechanisms. 
60 First, a new system was introduced under which the Minister may assign inspectors to: 
(a) carry out “compliance reviews … the purpose of which is to ensure that the 
Town Councils conduct their business in accordance with [the] Act [and rules made 
thereunder]”,95 which may lead to “recommendations for administrative or regulatory 
change”;96 or 
(b) conduct an “investigation … into the affairs of a Town Council” if, inter alia, 
“there are reasonable grounds to suspect a material irregularity in or affecting the 
conduct of the Town Council’s affairs” or if documents required in the course of 
compliance reviews are not produced.97 
61 Second, there are two courses of action available to the Minister (which, it must be 
noted, do not depend on the holding of a compliance review or an investigation): 
(a) First, the Minister now has the power to place the TC under “official 
management” – a process in which the members of the TC are suspended from office 
altogether.98 
 
95 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43A. 
96 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43A(4). 
97 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43B. 
98 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43G. 
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(b) Second, the Minister now has a power to order a TC to take specific actions to 
address “deficiencies … in the conduct of a Town Council’s affairs” or 
“irregularit[ies]… in the administration of a Town Council’s financial affairs”.99 Such 
orders are known as “rectification orders”. 
Each of these will now be considered in turn. 
(c) Compliance reviews and investigations 
62 All that needs to be said regarding compliance reviews and investigations is that the 
only coercive powers they create over TCs relate to the process of review or investigation, such 
as the powers to require documents to be produced, questions to be answered, and statements 
to be made.100 The existence of such powers of investigation does not detract from TCs’ 
autonomy to make discretionary decisions and act on them because the outcomes of the review 
and/or investigation are not coercive in nature. All they entail is a report being made to the 
Minister and the TC. 101  At the most, a compliance review report “may contain 
recommendations for administrative or regulatory change”, but nothing in the TCA requires 
that the TC implement or even consider these recommendations.102 
 
99 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) ss 43A–43D. 
100 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) ss 43A, 43C, 43E and 43F. 
101 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) ss 43A(3) and 43B(3) respectively. 
102 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43A(4). 
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(d) Official management 
63 The official management procedure is similar in effect to the former s 50 procedure, 
except that it is even more difficult for the Minister to invoke. A fortiori, therefore, it does not 
detract from TCs’ autonomy.103 To elaborate: 
(a) Limb (b) of the official management procedure requires an additional 
precondition not found in limb (b) of the s 50 procedure, namely, that the Minister must 
be satisfied that the Town Council “refuses or is unable to carry out” the duty required 
to be carried out urgently in order to remove the danger.104 
(b) There is also an additional precondition on top of limbs (a) and (b), which is 
that “the Minister is of the opinion that it is inappropriate for the Town Council to 
continue without official management”.105 
(c) There is also a more rigorous process by which the TC may make 
representations in response to a threatened official management order. Prior to making 
such an order, the Minister must notify the TC at least a week in advance and give the 
TC time to make representations in response.106 
(d) Moreover, judicial review of an official management order is likely to be 
possible. While there is ostensibly a statutory ouster clause (“Any decision of the 
Minister under subsection (1) is final”),107 it would appear not to be effective to oust 
 
103 See paras 52–55 above. 
104 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43G(1)(b). 
105 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43G(1). 
106 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43G(2). 
107 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43G(4). 
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judicial review because it is worded even less rigorously than other statutes which the 
courts have held to be ineffective to oust the power of judicial review.108  
(e) In addition, the courts are likely to conduct such judicial review intensively. The 
English Court of Appeal has persuasively held that because powers in which the 
Government may effectively replace a decision-maker (known as “default powers”) 
and “interfere with a high hand over local authorities” are “most coercive”, “the courts 
should be vigilant to see that this power of the central government is not exceeded or 
misused”.109 
64 This having been said, once the official management procedure has been successfully 
invoked, the consequences for the TC can be, at first glance, more severe than in the case of 
the former s 50 procedure. Under the official management procedure, the official manager has 
“full power to transact any business of the Town Council” [emphasis added].110 Moreover, “all 
members of the Town Council are suspended from office unless the Minister indicates 
otherwise”.111 
65 Nonetheless, as with the former s 50 procedure, the official management procedure can 
only be invoked in the case of very serious breaches of TCs’ duties. In Parliament, it was 
 
108 Re Application by Yee Yut Ee [1977–1978] SLR(R) 490 (“an award shall be final and conclusive, and no award 
or decision or order of a Court or the President or a referee shall be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, 
quashed, or called in question in any court and shall not be subject to certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or 
injunction in any court on any account”); Stansfield Business International Pte Ltd v Minister for Manpower 
[1999] 2 SLR(R) 866 (“The decision of the Minister on any representation made under this section shall be final 
and conclusive and shall not be challenged in any court.”) 
109 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Norwich City Council [1982] QB 808 at 824F–824G, per 
Lord Denning MR; see also 824F–825B. 
110 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43H(1). 
111 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43G(3). 
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described as being a “last resort”.112 Moreover, official management may only be ordered for 
a limited purpose: it must come to an end “when the Minister is satisfied that the reasons for 
the official manager’s appointment have ceased to exist”.113  
66 For these reasons, like the former s 50 procedure, the statutory provisions on official 
management do not render TCs other than autonomous from the Government. 
(e) Rectification orders 
67 The Minister may issue a rectification order if he is:114 
… of the opinion –  
(a) that deficiencies have been identified in the conduct of a Town Council’s 
affairs and that action must be taken to address them; or 
(b) an irregularity has occurred, or is occurring, in the administration of a Town 
Council’s financial affairs. 
68 The rectification order may order the TC to take specified action to “address the 
deficiencies” or “to correct the irregularity or to guard against the recurrence of irregularities 
(or both)”.115 
69 At first glance, rectification orders appear potentially draconian. Non-compliance with 
the rectification order is a criminal offence, punishable by a fine which increases with every 
 
112 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (10 March 2017) vol 94 “Town Councils (Amendment) 
Bill” (Desmond Lee, Senior Minister of State for National Development). 
113 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43G(5). 
114 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43D(1). 
115 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43D(2). 
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day during which the offence continues;116 the chairman or secretary of the TC may also be 
convicted of an offence punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment.117 One might therefore think 
that the threat of making rectification orders provides the Government with strong de facto 
control over TCs. 
70 In truth, however, the scope of rectification orders is significantly limited:  
(a) First, while the process leading to the making of a rectification order is less 
rigorous than that leading to the making of an official management order, it is still in 
principle possible for a TC to apply for judicial review of a rectification order.118  
(b) Second, although the legislation does not define “deficiencies” or “irregularity”, 
it is highly likely that these refer merely to a failure by a TC to fulfil its statutory duties. 
This being so, rectification orders do not hamper TCs’ autonomy, for they merely 
provide a means of compelling TCs to do what they “ought to have done in the first 
place” and “will not require the Town Council to take any action over and above what 
is necessary to bring the Town Council into compliance with the Town Councils Act 
and its subsidiary legislation”.119 
 
116 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43D(4). 
117 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 48A. 
118 Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Enforcing Town Councils’ Duties of Financial Prudence: Problems Addressed by the 
Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 923 at 947, para 60. 
119 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (10 March 2017) vol 94 “Town Councils (Amendment) 
Bill” (Desmond Lee, Senior Minister of State for National Development). For further commentary on rectification 
orders, see Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Enforcing Town Councils’ Duties of Financial Prudence: Problems Addressed 
by the Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 923 at 946–947, paras 56–60. 
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(f) Conclusion 
71 While the 2017 amendments to the TCA have intensified the Government’s oversight 
of TCs, they do not detract from TCs’ autonomy. Even when these mechanisms are capable of 
operating coercively, they are merely means of compelling TCs to perform compulsory duties 
mandated by law. 
72 For all the reasons above, TCs are neither de jure nor de facto extensions of the 
Government or of any statutory authority. Rather, they are independent legal entities in form 
as well as in substance. Notwithstanding that the Government may use grant conditions to 
influence TCs in their use of funds, such influence does not, either as a matter of law or of 
historical practice, extend to rendering TCs mere emanations of the Government. It is therefore 
not conceptually incoherent to say that TCs are capable of entering into private-law 
relationships with the Government. In other words, there is no conflict between the Proposal 
and the policy underlying the TCA. 
B. The Bridges rule  
73 Next, we must consider the Bridges rule, namely: “where an Act creates an obligation, 
and enforces the performance in a specified manner … that performance cannot be enforced in 
any other manner”.120 Does the TCA create an obligation to comply with grant conditions, and 
specify a manner by which this obligation may be enforced? 
74 The Bridges rule has its roots in the law on the tort of breach of statutory duty.121 The 
law will not impose tort liability for breach of statutory duty if to do so would go against 
 
120 Doe dem Murray, Lord Bishop of Rochester v Bridges (1854) 1 B & Ad 847 at 859; (1854) 109 ER 1001 at 
1006. See also the cases cited at n 63 above. 
121 The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this analogy. 
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legislative intention.122 Hence, for instance, if a statute criminalises a breach of a certain duty, 
a party may not seek to enforce that same duty by way of an action in tort for damages.123 So, 
too, if the person to whom the duty is owed has a statutory right of action124 or has a “remedy 
by way of judicial review”.125 
75 Of course, the analogy with breach of statutory duty is not a perfect one. The TCA does 
not create a statutory duty to comply with grant conditions; and the Proposal is a means to 
create a duty on the part of a TC rather than a means to enforce a duty which already exists 
under a statute. Nonetheless, the point remains: if the TCA discloses legislative intention not 
only as to what duties exist, but also to what remedies are available for them, then the Proposal 
risks stultifying the policy of the TCA.  
76 On the other hand, one must not forget the converse of the Bridges rule, namely, that:126 
If an obligation is created [by the statute], but no mode of enforcing its performance is 
ordained, the common law may, in general, find a mode suited to the particular nature 
of the case. 
This must be so because, otherwise, “the statute would be but a pious aspiration”.127 
 
122 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (Michael A Jones gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 22nd Ed, 2018) at para 9-13. 
123 Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 586 v Menezes Ignatius Augustine [1992] 1 SLR(R) 201 at 
[19]. 
124 Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 586 v Menezes Ignatius Augustine [1992] 1 SLR(R) 201 at [19] 
read with [11]. 
125 Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228 at 1237. 
126 Doe dem Murray, Lord Bishop of Rochester v Bridges (1854) 1 B & Ad 847, 859; 109 ER 1001, 1006. 
127 Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398 (UKHL) at 407. See also X v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 
633 (UKHL) at 731.  
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77 It will now be argued that the Proposal that grant conditions take the form of private-
law relationships between the Government and TCs does not contravene the Bridges rule. 
Therefore, if not for the Proposal, grant conditions would, too, be “but a pious aspiration”. 
 The Bridges rule does not apply to grant conditions 
78 First, and most simply, the Bridges rule does not even apply to grant conditions. The 
Bridges rule only applies “where an Act creates an obligation”.128 The TCA does not create 
grant conditions. Neither can it be said that the TCA creates a general statutory duty to comply 
with grant conditions. Nothing in the TCA requires that grant conditions take the form of 
obligations which are imperative for the TC to perform: for example, an obligation “to do X”. 
Consider the following possible forms of grant condition: 
(a) Case A: The TC must do X. (This implies that, if the TC breaches its 
obligation to do X, then it must return the grant money.)  
(b) Case B: The TC must either do X or return the grant money. 
(c) Case C: The TC must do X, or else the uses of the grant money may be 
restricted as follows … 
In case A, the TC has an obligation to do X. But in case B, and more obviously in case C, there 
is no obligation to do X; not doing X is simply an alternative choice available to the TC. In 
case B, for example, the TC will have to repay the money, but such repayment is not redress 
for the failure to do X. To borrow language from contract law:  
(a) In case A, doing X is a primary obligation, the breach of which gives rise to the 
secondary obligation to make repayment. 
 
128 Doe dem Murray, Lord Bishop of Rochester v Bridges (1854) 1 B & Ad 847, 859; 109 ER 1001, 1006. 
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(b) In case B, doing X and making repayment are alternative primary obligations, 
such that the failure to do X cannot be described as the breach of an obligation and 
making repayment cannot be described as a remedy for breach. 
(c) In case C, similarly, doing X and complying with the additional restrictions are 
alternative primary obligations.129  
79 Finally, even if grant conditions do take the form of A, the TCA is simply completely 
silent on how compliance with such conditions is to be secured.  
80 The author will now examine three statutory mechanisms which might appear to 
facilitate the enforcement of grant conditions, and explain why they do not in fact do so. 
 Section 21(2) of TCA cannot be used to enforce grant conditions 
81 Section 21(2) of the TCA cannot be used to enforce grant conditions, and therefore 
cannot be a remedy for the breach thereof. Section 21(2) provides that: 
Where a requirement or duty is imposed on a Town Council by this section, the 
[Housing and Development] Board or any person for whose benefit, or for the benefit 
of whose flat that requirement or duty is imposed on the Town Council, may apply to 
the High Court for an order compelling the Town Council to carry out the requirement 
or perform the duty, as the case may be. 
The duty to comply with grant conditions is not imposed on TCs “by this section”. One might 
argue that the duty is that set out in s 21(1)(f) of the TCA, which provides that TCs have the 
duty to “comply with the provisions of [the TCA] and the rules made thereunder”. But the fact 
 
129 See iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan Swee Leon [2016] 3 SLR 663 at [162]–[167]. 
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remains that grant conditions are provisions of neither the TCA nor rules (that is, subsidiary 
legislation) made under the TCA. 
 Former s 50 procedure and present official management procedure cannot be used to 
enforce grant conditions 
82 Both the former s 50 procedure and the present official management procedure, once 
triggered, allow the exercise of broad powers by, respectively, the “person” appointed by the 
Minister and the official manager. The former could “perform such powers, duties and 
functions of the Town Council” as ordered by the Minister;130 the latter has “full power to 
transact any business of the Town Council”. 131  Conceivably, if grant conditions are not 
complied with, the “person” could, or the official manager can, see to it that they are complied 
with. 
83 However, neither procedure amounts to a means of compelling compliance with grant 
conditions, for the simple reason that neither is triggered merely by non-compliance with grant 
conditions. Instead, they can be triggered only by certain types of breach of statutory duty, 
namely those relating to the physical condition of common property (viz duties to maintain the 
common property in “good and serviceable repair”, a “proper and clean condition” and without 
“danger to the health or safety of residents”).  
84 It has been argued that it may even be the case that neither the former s 50 procedure 
nor the official management procedure could be invoked to enforce obligations other than 
statutory duties relating to the physical condition of the common property.132 In such a case, 
 
130 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 50(1), prior to the Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017 
(Act 17 of 2017). 
131 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43H(1). 
132 See para 57 above. 
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any use of the official management procedure for the purpose of enforcing grant conditions 
would simply be ultra vires. 
 Rectification orders cannot be used to enforce grant conditions 
85 As we have seen, rectification orders may be used in order to address “deficiencies … 
in the conduct of a Town Council’s affairs” or an “irregularity … in the administration of a 
Town Council’s financial affairs”.133 However, non-compliance with terms of grant conditions 
does not necessarily amount to a “deficienc[y]” and/or “irregularity”. Consider, again, the three 
examples of possible forms of grant condition discussed above.134 In case A, it is arguable that 
the failure to do X is a “deficienc[y]” and/or an “irregularity”. But in cases B and C, there is 
nothing deficient or irregular about an omission to do X; doing X is simply one of several 
alternative choices available to the TC.  
 Grant conditions cannot be enforced through administrative law 
86 Finally, one might think that grant conditions might be enforced through an application 
for judicial review by the Government against a TC. There are, however, three problems with 
this. First, an application for judicial review by the Government, as opposed to by a private 
person against an executive body, is unheard of. Second, it is likely that the actions and 
decisions of a TC are not amenable to judicial review. This is because a TC’s choices as to how 
to spend its money are essentially an exercise of “management powers”, whereas judicial 
review cannot involve the court in a “management exercise”.135 Third, it is by no means clear 
 
133 Town Councils Act (Cap 329A, 2000 Rev Ed) s 43D(1). 
134 See para 78 above. 
135 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
[1981] AC 617 at 635G–635H. 
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that a mere failure to comply with grant conditions, without more, would mean that one of the 
recognised grounds of judicial review is made out.136 
 Conclusion on Bridges rule 
87 In short: the Bridges rule would only threaten the Proposal if there existed alternative 
means of enforcement of grant conditions which are expressly provided for in statute. The 
author has just argued that there is none, particularly because the TCA does not itself give rise 
to duties to comply with grant conditions. (This last point also explains why it cannot be said 
that the Government’s remedy for a TC’s breach of grant conditions ought to be to sue the TC 
in the tort of breach of statutory duty.) 
V. Possible types of private-law relationship between TCs and the Government 
88 Having defended the Proposal in principle, the author will now explore what kind of 
private-law relationships could conceivably exist between the Government and TCs, and 
potential challenges that may arise. In the course of doing so, where appropriate, the author 
will examine the reasoning of the High Court in AHPETC, which held that such private-law 
relationships were capable of existing as a matter of law, but that no contract or trust arose on 
the facts. The aim is not to comprehensively set out sample terms of contracts, trusts or 
bailments. Rather, it is simply to show that private-law relationships between the Government 
and TCs are capable of existing harmoniously with the relevant rules of private law. 
 
136 These grounds are “illegality, irrationality [and] procedural impropriety”, and possibly breach of substantive 
legitimate expectations (or some variant thereof): SGB Starkstrom Pte Ltd v Commissioner for Labour [2016] 3 
SLR 598 at [57], [59] and [63]. 
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C. Contracts 
89 A grant-in-aid could take the form of a contract between the Government and the TC. 
The author has given an example of such a contract above,137 which illustrates the potential 
degree of nuance that such a contract may contain. 
90 It may appear from certain dicta of the High Court in AHPETC that there can be no 
possibility of such a contract ever existing. However, on closer examination, the High Court 
said no such thing. What the High Court held was that the MND was wrong to claim that it had 
“a legal interest in disbursed grants-in-aid pursuant to a contractual mandate” [emphasis 
added].138 The High Court was right to reject such a submission: either the contract passes title 
to the money to the TC, in which case the Government has no legal interest;139 or the contract 
 
137 See para 11(b) above. 
138 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [137]. 
139 The Ministry of National Development attempted to argue that, on the contrary, Conservative and Unionist 
Central Office v Burrell [1982] 1 WLR 522 (“Burrell”) is authority for the proposition that there is such a thing 
as a “contractual mandate” which involves the mandatary retaining a legal interest in the moneys. This is, with 
respect, incorrect. As the High Court of England and Wales pointed out in that case, Burrell involved what is in 
substance a trust, not a contract (Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1980] 3 All ER 42 at 63c 
and 63e–63f):  
an obligation binding on the recipient to use the moneys subscribed for that purpose, to keep them 
separate from his own moneys and to return them if this purpose is frustrated or if the funds subscribed 
are more than is needed to accomplish it,  
in response to a breach of which  
… the court [may] restrain the recipient of such a fund from applying it (or any accretions to it such as 
income of investments made with it) otherwise tha[n] in pursuance of the stated purpose. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales also never described the “mandate” as being somehow 
contractual in nature. On the contrary, the Court of Appeal held that the remedy for misappropriation of funds 
was that the mandatee “like any other agent could be required to replace any money misapplied”: Conservative 
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does not pass title, in which case the Government’s legal interest in the money exists not 
“pursuant to” the contract, but rather simply because the Government always had such an 
interest as owner.  
91 The real problem in AHPETC was that there could be no contract because there was 
insufficient certainty of terms.140 But this problem can easily be avoided in future contracts. In 
particular, the Government may wish to demand some “clear and express provisions making 
[the contracts] amenable to legal action”, lest it be argued that the political nature of the subject 
matter is a “background of opinion adverse to enforceability” which negatives intention to 
create a contract.141  
D. Trusts 
 The possibility of trust relationships 
92 It ought, in principle, to be possible for the Government and a TC to enter into an 
arrangement such that the TC holds grant moneys on an express Quistclose trust142 for the 
Government.  
93 The main reason why the High Court in AHPETC held that no such trust existed was 
that there was insufficient certainty of intention to create a trust,143 as evidenced by certain 
features which were said to be inconsistent with a trust device. Some of these apply to 
 
and Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1982] 1 WLR 522 at 529, per Brightman LJ. This is reminiscent of a trust, 
not a contract. 
140 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [138]. 
141 Ford Motor Co Ltd v Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers [1969] 1 WLR 339 at 356. 
142 On the requirements for this, see n 24 above. 
143 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [116]–[121]. 
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Quistclose trusts in particular; others apply to trusts generally. The author will now examine 
and address each of these points in turn.  
 Segregation of grant moneys 
94 In AHPETC, no trust could exist because the grant moneys had not been segregated 
from other moneys belonging to the TC.144 This is not fatal to the existence of a trust in a future 
case in which grant moneys are held in a separate bank account from the TC’s other funds.145  
 Lack of restrictions on what grant moneys may be used for 
95 The High Court said that:146 
… [TCs’] freedom to allocate [the] sum [of grants-in-aid] on the very many kinds of 
projects with the purposes set-out in the TCA, which can include a project that could 
be very expensive with not much utility and on which not all their constituents would 
agree upon, shows that no resulting Quistclose trust can arise,  
particularly since, on the facts, the MND had not imposed any conditions on the grants.147 
 
144 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [119] and [134]–
[136]. 
145 This was what the Ministry of National Development (“MND”) had proposed for the future: in Attorney-
General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [3], the MND prayed that 
Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council be ordered to set up “Special Accounts”, which would be 
“segregated bank accounts … into which Grants payable for financial years 2014/15 and 2015/16 [would] be paid 
by MND to [AHPETC]”, and which would be specifically subject to monitoring by independent accountants. 
146 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [115]. 
147 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [116]. 
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96 By contrast, said the High Court, in order for a Quistclose trust to exist, there must be 
some more specific purpose for which the money is required to be used. On the facts, the 
alleged purpose of “increas[ing] the quantity of funds available to AHPETC” was far too broad 
and uncertain to found a Quistclose trust.148 It was akin to the classic example in Twinsectra 
Ltd v Yardley149 of a situation in which a Quistclose trust does not arise, namely, where the 
recipient of the funds can use the funds for anything at all.150  
However, this does not preclude a Quistclose trust from existing, provided only that the TC’s 
power to apply the grants-in-aid is expressed in a manner “sufficiently certain to be valid if the 
court can say that a given application of the money does or does not fall within its terms”.151 
 Who the beneficiary ought to be 
97 The High Court also held that there could be no trust because there could be no 
beneficiary: 
(a) The trust beneficiary could not be the MND, because:152 
… [i]t would be strange, to say the least, for the MND to be said to be the 
beneficial owner if the proper administration and expenditure of the 
aforementioned funds would directly benefit residents or the HDB. 
 
148 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [126]. 
149 [2002] 2 AC 164. 
150 For example, where pre-payments for goods are simply said to be usable by a vendor “as part of his cashflow”: 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 at [73], per Lord Millett. 
151 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 at [16], per Lord Hoffmann. 
152 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [128]. 
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(b) The trust beneficiary could not be the “residents or the HDB”, because:153  
… [i]f all the residents of a Town Council were to be the beneficial owners of 
grants-in-aid, they could theoretically come together and call for the 
disbursement of the moneys in contravention of the listed purposes in s 33(6) 
of the TCA.  
98 Point (b) does not concern us, as our aim is to demonstrate that the Government can be 
the beneficiary of a trust. For completeness, however, let it suffice to point out that the courts 
in cases such as In re Denley’s Trust Deed154 and In re the Trusts of the Abbott Fund155 have 
not been dissuaded from holding that a trust existed, notwithstanding that the various 
beneficiaries in those cases would not156 or could not157 exercise a Saunders v Vautier158 
power. 
99 As for point (a), the flaw in the reasoning is that it conflates being the beneficial owner 
of a trust fund with gaining the practical benefit of the use of that money. The former is a legal 
concept; the latter is a matter of fact. The former, not the latter, is the defining characteristic of 
a trust.  
100 To see why this is so, consider the (unrelated) case of a sub-trust: A holds X on trust for 
B, and B holds the equitable interest in X on trust for C. A is a trustee and B is a beneficiary, 
 
153 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [130]. 
154 [1969] 1 Ch 373. 
155 [1900] 2 Ch 326. 
156 In re Denley’s Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch 373 at 387F. 
157 In re the Trusts of the Abbott Fund [1900] 2 Ch 326 at 330–331. 
158 (1841) 41 ER 482. 
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notwithstanding that, because of the sub-trust in favour of C, B gains no factual benefit (and, 
in fact, is prohibited from gaining a benefit) from the equitable interest in X.  
101 Similarly, contrary to the High Court’s statement,159 it is possible that a TC is a trustee 
of grant moneys for the Government even though the Government does not itself derive any 
factual benefit from the use of the grant moneys (as the factual benefit is enjoyed only by 
residents and flat-owners). In Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd 160 itself, a 
company borrowed money from another company on condition that that the money be used for 
the purpose of paying a dividend to shareholders; the borrower held the money on a Quistclose 
trust to be used for the purpose of paying this dividend – a purpose from which the lender 
gained no factual benefit. Similarly, in the context of TCs, the defining feature is that the TC 
has a “power or duty … to use the money for the specified purpose”.161 It is not a requirement 
for a Quistclose trust in favour of the Government to arise that the “purpose” must be one that 
factually benefits the Government – a trust can exist even if the “purpose” is to factually benefit 
residents and flat-owners. 
102 Therefore, the beneficiary principle does not prevent a TC from holding grant moneys 
on trust for the Government. Even if the grant moneys are ultimately held for the purpose of 
bringing a factual benefit to residents, this is no bar to the Government being the legal 
beneficiary of a trust. 
 
159 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [128]. 
160 [1970] AC 567. 
161 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 [114(a)]. 
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 Consequences in insolvency 
103 Finally, the High Court suggested that the existence of a trust would lead to undesirable 
consequences if a TC were to become insolvent:162 
[I]f either the MND or Town Council residents were to be the beneficial owners of 
grants-in-aid, the grants-in-aid would not be payable to the general creditors of a Town 
Council in the event of insolvency, but to the beneficial owners. It is highly doubtful if 
this was an intended outcome of the statutory scheme … Even outside of an actual 
insolvency, the fact that general creditors would be subordinated to either the MND or 
Town Council residents would adversely impact the creditworthiness of Town 
Councils: this would also lead to the anomalous situation where S&CC funds would be 
payable to the general creditors, while grants-in-aid are not and will be refunded to the 
Government. If anything one would expect the situation to be reversed, and for 
residents’ money to be refunded to them in the event of insolvency. 
104 With respect, however, it is unclear why, as a matter of principle, any of these points 
should matter. This is for the following reasons: 
(a) First, the fact that the “general creditors” would be subordinated to the 
“beneficial owners” in the event of insolvency is neither here nor there. It is up to the 
“general creditors” to negotiate, at the time of the creation of debts owing from the TC 
to them, the terms of the debts, including whether security is required from the TC. At 
most, the High Court’s point is an argument that general creditors must not be taken by 
surprise by the existence of trusts. This worry can easily be addressed by publicising 
grants-in-aid.  
(b) Second, it cannot be definitively stated that TCs’ creditworthiness would be 
impacted by the “general creditors” being subordinated to the Government. Surely that 
 
162 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [132]. 
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must depend on the size of the debts owed to those “general creditors” compared to the 
amount of grants-in-aid. 
(c) Third, there is nothing “anomalous” about the idea that, if a TC becomes 
insolvent, residents would not get their money back. On the contrary, this would be 
wholly in line with the objective of the statutory scheme that “people … have to live 
with the consequences of their choice” of Town Councillors.163  
 Conclusion 
105 In short, there are no obstacles to grants-in-aid taking the form of trusts in favour of the 
Government. While the High Court discussed several objections at length, these objections turn 
out either to be misplaced, or to be directed only at the finding that there was a trust on the 
specific facts in AHPETC and not at the proposition that such a trust can exist in principle. 
E. Bailments 
106 Alternatively, a grant may take the form of a bailment, namely that which is “called 
mandatum … It is what we call in English an acting by commission”.164 If the TC breaches the 
terms of such a bailment, the Government can straightforwardly recover possession of the grant 
money.  
107 The classic case of mandatum is as described in the leading case of Coggs v Barnard165 
(“Coggs”): “when there is a delivery of goods or chattels to somebody, who is to carry them, 
or do something about them gratis, without any reward for such his work or carriage”,166 if “by 
 
163 Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2015] 4 SLR 474 at [46]. 
164 Coggs v Bernard (1703) 92 ER 107 at 113. 
165 (1703) 92 ER 107. 
166 Coggs v Bernard (1703) 92 ER 107 at 109. 
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[the carrier’s] ill management the goods are spoiled”, the consignor has an action against him. 
This is because the defendant carrier has expressly given an “undertaking to be careful”, and 
the plaintiff has only consigned the goods to him because of this promise. The defendant’s 
failure to comply with this undertaking is therefore tantamount to a “fraud upon the 
plaintiff”.167 Moreover, it does not matter that the defendant is providing the delivery service 
for no charge: “[T]he owner’s trusting him with the goods is a sufficient consideration to oblige 
him to a careful management.”168 
108 This logic has since been extended to cover cases where the property bailed is not 
goods, but rather “money to be applied for a certain purpose”.169 An example is Whitehead v 
Greetham170 (“Whitehead”), in which the plaintiff had given money to the defendant to use to 
purchase an annuity which would yield “well and sufficiently secured” returns; the defendant, 
in breach of an express promise to “use due and sufficient care”, used the money to buy an 
annuity from someone who turned out to be insolvent. The court pithily held that the plaintiff 
thereby had a cause of action simply by analogy to Coggs.171 
109 One can immediately see the analogy with the situation of a TC which has been 
entrusted with grant money by the Government for a specific purpose, provided that the grant 
money is segregated from the TC’s other moneys.172 Had the TC not undertaken to use the 
moneys for that purpose, the Government would not have handed the money over. In such a 
situation, the Government would retain property in the money; the TC would only have a right 
of possession limited according to the terms of the bailment, and such limited powers as are 
 
167 Coggs v Bernard (1703) 92 ER 107 at 113. 
168 Coggs v Bernard (1703) 92 ER 107 at 113. 
169 Norman Palmer, Palmer on Bailment (London: Thomson Reuters, 3rd Ed, 2009) at para 11-001. 
170 Whitehead v Greetham (1825) 130 ER 385; cited in Norman Palmer, Palmer on Bailment (London: Thomson 
Reuters, 3rd Ed, 2009) at para 11-001, fn 4. 
171 Whitehead v Greetham (1825) 130 ER 385 at 387. 
172 Norman Palmer, Palmer on Bailment (London: Thomson Reuters, 3rd Ed, 2009) at para 3-080. 
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necessary to fulfil the purpose.173 Therefore, in the event of a breach of the terms of the 
bailment, the Government would be entitled to recover the money.174 
110 One might seek to distinguish the case of TCs from more traditional cases of bailments 
as follows. In the traditional cases, the plaintiff has some stake in the defendant’s performance: 
in Whitehead, the plaintiff’s interest was his intention to use the annuity as a source of income; 
in Coggs, the plaintiff may well have retained a proprietary interest in the goods as owner, or 
at least had the hope of selling the goods for profit. On the other hand, it is not clear that the 
Government can properly be said to derive a benefit from the TC’s performance of its duties.  
111 But this is a red herring. The true ratio of Coggs and Whitehead is not that the plaintiff 
stood to benefit from the defendant’s performance, but rather simply that the defendant had 
promised to perform: 
(a) Whitehead tells us that the “consideration” on which the plaintiff could sue was 
simply “[t]hat the Defendant promised to lay [the money] out [to buy the annuity] 
securely, and that the Plaintiff delivered him the money for that purpose”.175 
(b) Coggs is even clearer that the crux of mandatum is the plaintiff’s reliance on his 
having “intrust[ed] the bailee upon his undertaking to be careful”,176 and not that the 
plaintiff stood to benefit from what the bailee would do. This is evident from the court’s 
 
173 Norman Palmer, Palmer on Bailment (London: Thomson Reuters, 3rd Ed, 2009) at para 4-012. 
174  Norman Palmer, Palmer on Bailment (London: Thomson Reuters, 3rd Ed, 2009) at para 4-017, citing 
Plasycoed Collieries Co Ltd v Partridge, Jones & Co Ltd [1912] 2 KB 345 at 351:  
[W]here chattels have been placed in the hands of a bailee for a limited purpose, and he deals with them 
in a manner wholly inconsistent with the terms of the bailment, and consistent only with his intention to 
treat them as his own, the right to possession revests in the owner, who can sue the bailee in trover. 
175 Whitehead v Greetham (1825) 130 ER 385 at 387. 
176 Coggs v Bernard (1703) 92 ER 107 at 113. 
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holding that a “bailment of goods, delivered by one man to another to keep for the use 
of the bailor”177 [emphasis added] is a separate type of bailment from mandatum. 
112 Finally, for completeness, none of this is changed by the doctrine of consideration, 
which bars the enforcement of gratuitous promises as a matter of contract law. This is because 
liability in bailment, including gratuitous bailments, is sui generis rather than contractual (or 
tortious).178 
VI. Conclusion 
113 One might attempt to justify the Court of Appeal’s rejection in AHPETC of the use of 
private-law devices to enforce TCs’ statutory duties relating to financial prudence, on the 
ground that that would have stultified the statutory provisions specifically aimed at enforcing 
those duties (such as s 21 of the TCA). However, putting aside the problem that those statutory 
provisions were themselves conceptually and problematically problematic,179 this is no reason 
to reject entirely the notion that TCs are capable of entering into private-law relationships with 
the Government. Neither does anything in the nature of TCs or in the TCA reject such a notion.  
114 On the contrary, recognising the possibility of such private-law relationships would 
promote the aims of the TC scheme by allowing for a more structured negotiation, with more 
nuanced results, of government funding to TCs and TCs’ use thereof, backed by mechanisms 
to enforce the agreed-on terms of funding. The combination of the process of negotiation of 
grant conditions with the enforceability of the grant conditions eventually agreed upon would 
 
177 Coggs v Bernard (1703) 92 ER 107 at 109. 
178 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2010] QB 1 at [48(h)]. In particular, Whitehead v Greetham (1825) 130 
ER 385 itself was cited with judicial approval as recently as the 1950s, both in passing in England and Wales 
(Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 1018 at 1032), and applied by the Federation of Malaya (Ali Ahmad v 
Chop Bee Hin [1950] MLJ 55). 
179 Benjamin Joshua Ong, “Enforcing Town Councils’ Duties of Financial Prudence: Problems Addressed by the 
Town Councils (Amendment) Act 2017” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 923 at 935–940, paras 30–42. 
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recognise both TCs’ autonomy from the Government as well as the need to hold TCs 
accountable for their use of government grants, filling a significant lacuna in the law.  
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Appendix: TCs’ reliance on government grants 
115 The following table contains data gathered from TCs’ financial statements for the 
financial years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015.180 These financial years have been chosen in order 
to exclude the effect of transfers between TCs arising from changes in TCs’ boundaries 
following the general election held in September 2015. The table illustrates the importance of 
government grants to TCs by showing that, if not for government grants, most TCs would have 
operated at a deficit during these financial years.  
 
180 These may be found on Town Councils’ websites, and/or by performing an ‘exact phrase’ search for “town 
council” through the “Papers Presented to Parliament Series” page on the website of the National Archives of 
Singapore: http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/government_records/highlights (accessed 9 May 2019). 
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* It should be noted that AHPETC’s auditors disclaimed their opinion on the financial statements for the financial 
years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015.  
